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Abstract
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1 Introduction
In the literature on unemployment and the effect of unemployment benefits, search
theory has shown to be an adaptable tool. The analysis of partial search models, which
focus on worker behavior and treat the wage offer distribution as given, is widespread.
Such models are able to explain many stylized facts (see e.g. surveys by Devine and
Kiefer  (1991), Layard, Nickel1 and Jackman  (1991) and Wolpin (1995)). However, a
number of important issues can not be analyzed with these partial models. This of
course includes all research issues related to wage determination, employer behavior,
interaction between worker and employer behavior, and the effects of policies that
directly affect wages.
All of the latter issues are of great imp ortance for the analysis of the lower end
of the labor market. Most economists and politicians agree that the situation at the
lower end of the labor market constitutes one of the biggest problems of modern society.
In Europe, long term unemployment of unskilled workers is dramatically high. In the
U.S., unskilled workers often work at very low wages (for recent surveys, see e.g. Layard,
Nickel1 and Jackman  (1991), Krugman (1994), Bean (1994),  Card and Krueger (1995)
and Snower and De la Dehesa (1997)).
We feel that a search model that aims at giving an accurate and useful description
of the lower end of the labor market should not treat the demand side of the labor
market as given. In search theory, the optimal strategy of the workers usually has
the reservation wage property. If employers know this, then in equilibrium their wage
offers mnst  equal the reservation wage of some (group of) worker(s). If the wage offerSt  ‘.
distribution depends on the distribution of reservation wages, then parameter changes
that affect the reservation wages of job searchers also affect the wage offer distribution
that they face. It is thus obvious that one has to take account of these interrelation
between supply and demand if one wishes to use the model for policy analyses. For
instance, an important question as the effect of unemployment benefits on job search by
the unemployed cannot be answered satisfactorily without allowing for the possibility
that employers respond to changes in the behavior of job seekers. In sum, we need an
equilibrium model.
In this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of a model that
generalizes previous equilibrium search models. Recently, the theoretical and empirical
literature on equilibrium search has made substantial progress. The present paper
thus contributes to the literature to date, and it is useful for our purposes to briefly
summarize this literature.’ We will argue that our model generalization can be regarded
as a step forward in the attempt to provide an accurate description of the lower end
‘See Davidso n (1990),  Burdett (1990) and Ridder and Van den Berg (1997) for additional descrip-
tions of this literature.
of the labor market.
l Equilibrium search models provide a structural framework for labor markets in
which the wage offer distribution which workers face in their search emerges as the
equilibrium of a non-cooperative wage-search and wage-posting game between workers
and employers. The seminal paper by Diamond (1971) shows that, in an economy
where both workers and firms are homogeneous, with no possibility for workers to
search while employed, the resulting equilibrium wage distribution is a mass point at
the wage prevailing if labor demand is monopolized (which is the workers’ opportunity
cost of employment). As has been noted above, in the general case, equilibrium wage
offers must equal the reservation wage of some (group of) worker(s). Intuitively, this
is because otherwise a firm can reduce its wage offer without loss of potential workers.
Thus, a model in which potential workers at a firm differ in their reservation wage
values may generate wage dispersion. Basically, two approaches can be distinguished
in the literature, depending on the source of this reservation wage heterogeneity. In
both cases, the Diamond (1971) model serves as the point of departure.
In the first approach (MacMinn (1980),  Albrecht and Axe11  (1984)), workers are
heterogeneous by nature. In particular, they differ in their opportunity cost of employ-
ment. (The latter may be the result of heterogeneity in their value of leisure, their
unemployment benefits, their search intensity etc.). This implies heterogeneity of thea,
unemployed workers’ reservation wages. Allowing for such heterogeneity may gener-
ate wage dispersion. It can be shown that the support of the equilibrium wage offer
distribution is a subset of (or coincides with) the set of unemployed workers’ reser-
vation wages. In this model, the observable exit rate out of unemployment displays
negative duration dependence. The latter is an important stylized fact which accounts
for the fact that a substantial fraction of the unemployed in Europe experience very
long durations. In the model, the negative duration dependence is due to the unob-
served heterogeneity in the unemployed workers’ opportunity cost of employment. The
model thus also predicts that at least some unemployed workers reject at least some
of their job offers some of the time. In the absence of the latter, there would be no
choice element in unemployment, and as a result the model would not be sufficiently
rich to analyze policy measures aimed at modifying unemployed workers’ behavior. In
particular, if all workers accept all job offers all the time then there is no direct effect
of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration. MacMinn (1980) and Albrecht
and Axe11 (1984) 1a so allow for firm heterogeneity in their model. In general, higher
productivity firms offer higher wages and are therefore able to attract more workers.
Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) estimate this model. They conclude that the fit to
unemployment durations is good while the fit to the wage data is not good. The latter
is due to the fact that each point of support of the wage offer distribution necessarily
equals the reservation wage of an unemployed worker type (see also the discussion by
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Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) of their results).
l In the second approach to model wage dispersion in an equilibrium search frame-
work (Mortensen (1990),  Burdett and Mortensen (1998)),  ex ante identical workers are
allowed to search for another job while working. Search on the job is by now regarded to
be an important source of wage dispersion (see references below) as well as of individual
wage growth. Of course, job-to-job transitions simply represent a substantial fraction
of all labor market transitions, and they provide an option for unskilled workers to
increase their income in the long run. In the equilibrium model, working individuals
only change jobs if the wage offer exceeds a reservation wage value that is increasing
in their current wage. A firm that sets a high wage is thus able to attract workers
from firms offering lower wages. So, if individuals work at different wages then, from
the point of view of an employer, the labor supply curve is upward sloping, and there
is again a trade-off between the wage and the labor force of the firm, which in turn
generates equilibrium wage dispersion.
This model makes some empirically sensible predictions, notably on the relations
between job durations, wages, and the size of firms (see Ridder and Van den Berg
(1997) for a survey). Yet, the main prediction of the homogeneous model is that the
equilibrium wage density is increasing, which is at odds with the data. Additional het-
erogeneity seems therefore needed to make the Burdett-Mortensen model a reasonable
empirical description of labor markets.
Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997) develop and estimate a version of
the Burdett-Mortensen model in which workers are identical but firms differ in their
marginal productivity of labor, which is assumed to be continuously distributed (note
that the latter type of heterogeneity by itself is not able to generate wage dispersion
in the Diamond (1971) model). They show that equilibrium is such that each firm
offers a unique wage which is a one-to-one increasing function of its productivity type.
They also show that there exists a minimum set of constraints on the shape of any
distribution to be implementable as the equilibrium of this game. As a consequence, by
choosing an appropriate distribution of productivity types, the model allows a perfect
fit to the wage data density. Nevertheless, this model does not provide a satisfactory
description of the unemployment duration distribution, and it is not sufficiently rich
and flexible to study labor market policies like changes in unemployment benefits.
It is clear that each of the two modeling approaches discussed above captures im-
portant labor market phenomena. It is however also clear that, in order to obtain a
model that is able to provide a sufficiently rich description of the lower end of the la-
bor market, we need a comprehensive equilibrium search model that combines the two
different modeling approaches. In the theoretical part of this paper, we develop such a
model. We will be particularly concerned with continuous heterogeneity distributions
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of productivities across firms and of opportunity costs of employment across workers.2
Qualitative features of the equilibrium solution are more transparent in the continuous
case. Moreover, our model allows a feasible nonparametric estimation method for con-
t,inuous  heterogeneity distributions, whereas a similar method for discrete distributions
does not exist.
Unfortunately, accounting for both kinds of heterogeneity (workers’ search costs
and firms’ productivities) in the most general way rapidly makes the analysis extremely
intractable. We therefore choose here to limit the generality of the model somewhat by
assuming that job offer arrival rates are the same whether a worker is unemployed or
employed. This may seem restrictive. However, the only other equilibrium search model
with both kinds of heterogeneity that has ever been estimated on individual data is
provided by Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), and they assume that employed workers do
not receive alternative offers. Since other empirical studies based on equilibrium search
models either accept the null hypothesis of equality of arrival rates (see Van den Berg
and Ridder’s (1998) analysis of Dutch data), or find that the arrival rate of job offers
to employees is an order of magnitude smaller than that of unemployed job searchers3,
at least our model, together with Eckstein and Wolpin’s model, could provide useful
benchmarks.
We provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the model. We investigate
whether equilibrium exists and is unique. It turns out that log-concavity of the dis-
tribution of workers’ opportunity costs of employment is sufficient for uniqueness. We
also derive expressions for the distributions of endogenous variables (reservation wages,
spell durations, wages, profits, firm sizes) in terms of the primitives of the model. Part
of the theoretical analysis concerns the derivation of qualitative features of the equilib-
rium solutions. For example, we derive necessary conditions for the wage distributions
to display a peak at the minimum wage.
We also structurally estimate the model. We develop and apply an estimation
method that estimates the frictional parameters as well as the heterogeneity distri-
butions. The distribution of worker heterogeneity is estimated along with the frictional
parameters, treating the distribution of observed wages as a nuisance “parameter”.
The productivity distribution is subsequently estimated nonparametrically, by way of
an inversion from observed wages to productivities.
The estimation results are used to shed more light on the situation at the lower
end of the labor market. For example, to what extent is unemployment due to large
values of workers’ opportunity costs of employment, and to what extent are the latter
2Mortense (n 1990) examines model properties in the special case of discrete heterogeneity distri-
butions with a finite number of points of support.
3This  is evidence from Kiefer and Neumann’s (1993) study of US data and Bontemps,  Robin  and
Van den Be& (1997) analysis of French data.
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due to high unemployment benefits.‘7 To what extent do firms exploit the monopsony
power that they derive from the presence of search frictions? What happens when the
opportunity costs of employment increase?
The empirical analysis is the first analysis ever in which both sources of wage dis-
persion (that is, worker heterogeneity in the opportunity cost of employment, and
on-the-job search) are simultaneously taken into account. As such it is the true syn-
t,hesis between the empirical analyses in Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) on the one hand,
and Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997) (and the other empirical analyses of
(extensions of) the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model) on the other. We are thus
able to address the empirical importance of these two sources of wage dispersion as
determinants of total wage variation. Also, since we allow for firm heterogeneity, we are
able to address the importance of the latter in obtaining a good fit to the wage data.
From the results in Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997) we expect that allowing
for firm heterogeneity enables a perfect fit to the wage data. The distribution of worker
heterogeneity can be thought of as being fitted to the unemployment duration data.
This can be contrasted to Eckstein and Wolpin (1990),  in which the distribution of
worker heterogeneity had to account for the fit of both the wage and the duration data
distribution.
In Sections 2, 3 and 4 of this paper we develop the theoretical model. The special
case in which workers are homogeneous but productivities are continuously distributed
has been examined in detail by Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997). It is also
instructive to examine the special case in which firms are homogeneous but workers’
opportunity costs are continuously distributed. This case has been studied in some
detail by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). In Section 3, we extend their analysis of this
special case, and we will pay particular attention to empirically relevant model prop-
erties. For the general case, we find that the equilibrium wage distribution cannot be
obtained as an explicit expression. We therefore consider numerical examples. Section 5
is devoted to the construction of the estimation method, which is subsequently applied
on a dataset  of individual labor market histories. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The setup of the model we discuss in this paper is basically the same as in Bontemps,
Robin and Van den Berg (1997), except that we now allow for heterogeneity in the
opportunity cost of employment of workers.
2.1 The labor market setup, and the strategy of workers and
.
firms
Individuals seek to maximize the expected steady-state discounted (at rate p) future
income. The opportunity cost of employment is denoted b,  which includes search costs
and unemployment benefits. Its distribution in the population of individuals is denoted
bv H, and we assume that H is continuous on its support with infimum point b (b > 0)-
and supremum 6 (6 < +oo).  Job offers accrue at the constant rate X  > 0. A job offer is
characterized by a drawing from a wage distribution F  (w and w denote the infimum
and supremum point of the support of F; u/ can a priori be infinite). Note that neither
the arrival rate nor the distribution of wage offers depends on the current state of the
job searcher (employed or unemployed). Layoffs accrue at the constant rate 6. In the
following, we denote K = X/S. The next result is well known,
Proposition 1 The optimal strategy when unemployed is to accept any wage offer w
such that w > b, where b is his opportunity cost of employment. The optimal strat--
egy when employed is to accept any wage o#er strictly greater than the present wage
contract.
Because job offers accrue at the same rate whatever the state of workers, the reser-
vation wage is explicit and equal to the opportunity cost of employment. Thus, the
strategy of workers is independent of the steady-state wage offer distribution. This rules
out feedback from wages and firm behavior to workers’ optimal equilibrium strategies.
Now let us turn to firm behavior. A standard assumption in equilibrium job search
models is that workers draw job offers by randomly picking firms using a uniform sam-
pling scheme (here and in the sequel, we use ‘Lworker”  as a synonym for individual).
If a given firm, whatever its size, offers only one wage (which is the maintained as-
sumption in this paper), and if all firms want to expand by posting vacancies (which
will be shown to be true below), then F(w) must also be the measure of firms offering
a wage less than w. Consider a firm with a flow p of marginal revenue generated by
emploving a worker. We assume that p does not depend on the number of workers at
the firm,  and consequently we will refer to this firm as a firm of type p and to p as
the (labor) productivity of this firm. We assume that such a firm seeks to maximize its
steadv-state profi t flow:
where 1 (w) is the size of the labor force that it can expect to employ if all workers
behave so as to maximize their expected wealth and if all other firms’ wage offers are
distributed according to the distribution F.
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The assumption that a firm offers one wage value to all its potential employees
deserves some discussion, in the light of the fact that potential employees have different
reservation wages. In particular, unemployed job applicants have different values of b,
so their fallback  options are of different magnitudes. If firms observe the values of b
then they could exploit this by offering lower wages to applicants with lower values of
b. It is conceivable that then equilibrium is such that a given firm pays different wages
to workers with identical productivity in identical jobs, just because these workers
had different reservation wages  at the time they applied. We thus have to a,ssume
that firms are not able to observe the b-values of job applicants, or that they are
not allowed to pay different wages to individuals with different b,  or that the costs
involved in paying different wages to individuals with different b  are too high. The
first assumption is an asymmetric-information assumption. It may be plausible if b
consists mainly of the non-pecuniary utility of leisure, and if firms are not able to
observe the applicant’s unemployment duration (since the latter is informative on b).
The second and third assumptions can be justified by within-firm fairness constraints
or by costs considerations. Manning (1993) argues that costs considerations make the
single-wage setting assumption less restrictive for anonymous markets with low-skilled
workers than for markets with high-skilled workers. It should be noted that previous
studies (e.g. Albrecht and Axe11 (1984),  Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) and Albrecht and
\iroman (1996)) 1a so assume that firms do not offer different wages to workers with
different b.
Firms may differ by their labor productivity p.  The distribution function of p is
I’(p), which is continuous; p > 0 is the infimum point of the support of I’ (we assume-
that p > b; this ensures that there will be production in the economy) and p < +oo-
the supremum.  We also assume that p has a finite mean, i.e. E,(p) < 00.  Note that
a firm does not offer a wage exceeding its revenue product p because profits would be
negative. As a result, EF(%U)  < 00.
At this stage it is alreadv clear that firms do not offer a wage w < b,  because they
would not hire anybody and, as a result, would have zero profit. Note that since p > b,-
it is always possible to operate at a positive profit by offering a wage in between the
latter two values. Thus, F(b-) = 0 and w 2 0. (Here and in the following, F(z-)  =
lim,,, F(J:  -  &),F(w)  = 1 - F(w).)
We do not assume from the outset that all firms of the same type necessarily have
the same strategy. If different wage values yield identical profit, two firms may choose
different strategies (this is the case when both workers and firms are homogeneous, see
Mortensen (1990)). An optimal strategy for a firm of type p will thus be a point in a
set KP  of profit maximizing wages:
l-cp = argmax {7+& w) I w L u>
211
with ~(p,  w) as in equation (1)
v Finally, the measure of participants is normalized to one and the (endogenous)
measure of unemployed is the unemployment rate U.  The measure of firms is also
normalized to one.
2.2 The steady-state demographic equilibrium
In this subsection, we derive the implications of the maintained assumption that all
demographic stocks do not change when time passes, exit flows being balanced by entry
2.2.1 Distribution of workers’ heterogeneity in various subsamples
Let H, denote the distribution of b in the stock sample of unemployed and H,  the
distribution of b in the stock sample of employed. Then, for all b  :
H(b) = uH,(b)  + (1 - u)H,(b).
Clearly, both probability measures H,  and H, are dominated by H, hence they admit
Radon-Nykodin densities dH,/dH  and dH,/dH  such that
1 udH,o-
dH + (1
d%(b)- ‘IL)-.
dH
Clearly also, H, is dominated by HU:  if a subset B of [b,  6] has probability H,(B) equal
to 0, then it is also true that H,(B) = 0, because any employed worker has a positive
probability of being laid off. Note however that HU  and H may not be dominated by H,
because no worker with opportunity cost of employment b greater than w will ever be
willing to be employed (i.e. H,(W)  = 1). Let us call 6 = min { 6,  m}. This value will have
some importance in the sequel. Only the fraction H(b) of workers is really participating
to the market. Note that H(b) and b, via W,  are functions of the equilibrium wage offer
distribution F.
Moreover, in a steady-state demographic equilibrium, assuming that unemployed
accept any wage greater or equal to the reservation wage, the flow of layoffs must be
equal to the flow into unemployment:
S(l - u)H,(b)  = XuH,,(b)
if b < w,  and-
s(l - u)He.o = XUH&I) + Au  /“F(r-)dH&)
W-
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if b  > w.  Hence,
.
ep(b-).-
Combining equalities (2) and (3) vields:0
if b < w, and-
(1 - u)H,(b)  = &H(w)  + .If,”  1 ;$;;&  dH(x),- P-
if b > w. h/Ioreover,
1
u&L(b)  = GWb)
if b < a, and-
uH,(b)  =
(3)
(4)
(5)
if b > w.
2.2.2 Distribution of wages in the sample of employed
Let G(w) be the measure of individuals with a wage lower or equal to w in the sample of
employed. In a steady-state demographic equilibrium, the flow of layoffs in an interval
(t, t + dt] is 6(1 - u)G(  w). The measure of upgraded wages is, assuming that only
wages strictly greater than present wage are accepted, equal to Ap(w)(  1 -  u)G(w).
The measure of unemployed individuals of tvpe b accepting a wage greater or equal to
the reservation wage is X  [F(w) - F(b-)]  u. At q ‘lbe ui 1 rium, one must have equal flows
in and out of unemployment. Hence,
[b  +  Xp(,)]  ( 1  -  u)G(w)  = XUF(W)H,(YJ)
+xu JW  [F(w)  -  W)]  dH,w (8)
W-
H,(w)  is the fraction of unemployed who are willing to work for any wage. Integrating
by part the right-hand side of this equation yields the following equivalent form of the
steady-state employment equation flow:
[l  + tcF(w)]  (1 -  u)G(w)  = mJw  H,(x)dF(x). (9)
W-
Note that using the equations from the preceding subsection, one also obtains that
[l+  .F(w)]  (1 -  u)G(w) = H(w) -  [l+  nF(w)]  uH,(w) (10)
The next proposition follows immediately:
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Proposition 2 In a steady-state equilibrium,, one must have:,
G(w) =
H(w)  - [I+
The equation above for u splits the unemplovment ra,te  u into three components that
can be associated with three subgroups of individuals: (i) those who accept any job
offer while unemployed, (ii) those who accept some job offers and reject others, and
(iii) those who reject all job offers. Individuals in the third subgroup are permanently
unemployed.
In the model with homogeneous workers, all unemployed workers accept all job of-
fers, so F(w) is equal to the distribution of accepted wages in the inflow at a given point
of time into to employment. In the present model, for any given F,  the distribution of
accepted wages in this inflow first-order stochastically dominates F,  because individu-
als with high b only accept high wages. It is not difficult to show that if F has density
f, then the density of accepted wages in the inflow is proportional to f(w)H,(w). The
latter density is of importance in the empirical analysis, as the data provide drawings
from the corresponding distribution, and we mav require a good fit to such data.”
2.2.3 Measure of workers per firm paying a certain wage
Because of the assumption that workers draw offers by sampling firms using a uniform
sampling scheme then, in a steady state equilibrium, the measure of workers 1(w)
employed by a firm offering a wage w is the Radon-Nykodin density of distributiona,
(1 - u)G  with respect to F.
Proposition 3 Any set of F-probability zero is also of G-probability zero and any wage
w which is a mass point of F is a mass point of G, and conversely. Moreover, for all
wages ‘w in the support of F, the Radon-Nykodin density of distribution (1 - u)G  with
respect to F is:
I( >
d(1 - u)G(w)
w =
dF
~(1 - u)G(w)  + huh,-
1+ tqw-)  l
KHo
-
- [l + S(w-)]  [l+ S(w)]
(11)
10
Proof. By definition of the Stieltjes integral the function JTm  H,,(z)dF(z) defines
a measure which is absolutely continuous with respect to F,  and its Radon-Nykodin
density  is H,,(W).  Moreover, for all positive &, using equation (9):”
KU,
s
w  H,(z)dF(x).
1 - 7.4 W-E
= [I + .&)]  G(w) - [l  + h;,F(w - E)]  G(w - E)
= &I  [F(w) - F(w  - E)]  G(tw)  + [l  + tc,F(w  - E)]  [G(w) - G(w - E)]  .
It follows that any mass point of F is a, mass point of G: and conversely. Moreover, the
Radon-Nykodin density of (1 - u)G  with respect to F is given by the formula stated
in the proposition. Note that here we treat u as a constant. 0
The expression for 1 (w) given F equals the product of (i) the expression for 1 (w)
given F in the model in which individuals are homogeneous and (ii) H(w). This makes
sense, as H(w) measures the proportion of individuals who are willing to participate
on a market where only wages smaller than or equal to w are offered.
The following properties of l(w) immediately follow from equation (ll), because H
is assumed to be continuous:
Proposition 4 l(w) is a non-decreasing function of w. Moreover, it is right-disconti-
nuous at any point w that is a mass point of F (or, equivalently, G).
Equilibrium search models therefore predict that the high-wage firms are also the
large firms. A prediction which has some empirical content. Note that this is true
whatever the equilibrium wage distribution. This is due to the fact that high-wage
firms attract more workers. It is important to realize that in our model there are two
channels by way of which this works. First, high-wage firms attract more unemployed
workers. In particular, they attract workers with relatively high b,  who are not attracted
by low-wage firms. This is the channel modeled by Albrecht and Axe11 (1984). Secondly,
high-wage firms attract more employed workers. In particular, they attract employed
workers with relatively high wages, who are not attracted by low-wage firms. This is
the channel modeled by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). In the empirical analysis we
are able to address the empirical relevance of both channels as means to increase the
labor force of a firm, for different labor markets.
2.3 Definition and properties of market equilibrium
The following definition of the economic equilibrium, as well as certain of the propo-
sitions below, are adapted from Mortensen (1990) who considers the case of discrete
heterogeneity distributions, and from Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997) who
1 1
consider the case of a non-degenerate, continuous productivity distribution. The aim
of this subsection is to derive analytical characteristics of the equilibrium wage dis-
tribution when there is a continuum of workers indexed by their opportunity cost of
employment b drawn from a continuous distribution H, and a non-degenerate, contin-
uous productlivity  distribmion I-‘.
Definition. A market equilibrium is defined by (F(=;  p), JI  > p)  such that, simultane--
ously,
1. the distribution of wa.ge  offers in the economy is
2. Each worker whose opportunity cost of employment is b  follows the strategy
explained in Proposition 1.
3. The strategy of each type-p firm is to randomly draw a wage from a probability
distribution F(-;  p)  which puts probability 1 on the set I$  of profit maximizing
wages of type-p firms given other firms’ and workers’ strategies, i.e.
K p =qmax(~(P,w)  I w I P>,
W
with
T(P,  4 = (P - 4
KH(w)
[l + G-(w)]  [l+ KF+-K)]
Recall that, because of the assumption that the job offer arrival rate in employment
has exactly the same value as in unemployment, the optimal strategy of unemployed
individuals does not depend on the expression of F. This makes the definition of
equilibrium recursive in the specific sense that there is no feedback from firms’ behavior
to workers’ behavior. This simplifies the analysis in comparison to Bontemps, Robin
and Van den Berg ( 1997)4.  However, as will be shown below, the presence of H(w) in
the expression for ~(p, w) complicates the analysis in comparison to Bontemps, Robin
and Van den Berg (1997).
Proposition 5 A wage ofer  w that attracts workers is profit maximizing for employers
of type p > w only if no mass of other employers offer w. Consequently,  the equilibrium
wage offer distribution has no mass point.
4Note  that the optimal strategy of employed individuals does not depend on F regardless of whether
the arrival rates are equal.
1 2
Proof. see Bontemps, Robin, Van den Berg (1997). This comes from the fact
that if there is a mass point in W,  then 1 (w) is also right-discontinuous (and strictly
increasing) in w. A firm which offers w can therefore deviate and offer a little more to
make more profit. cl
Corollary 1 1 (w) is continuous.
Proof. This is a simple consequence of the fact that both F  and H are continuous.
cl
Proposition 6 (a) At the equilibrium, the set I$,  of profit maximizing wages of type-j
firms is closed.
(b) Let p1 > p,  be two productivities, and let w1  E KP1 and w2 E KP2.  Then w1 > w2.-
Proof. see Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997).
In equilibrium, high-productivity firms offer high wages, have higher profits and employ
more workers.
Proposition 7 If the distribution I? of labor productivities is continuous, then there
exists a function K ma,pping  supp(r) into supp(F),  such that KP = {K(p)} r-almost
surely.
Proof. see Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997).
It thus follows that, when there is a continuous distribution of firms’ types, the
only equilibrium strategies are pure strategies. At the equilibrium, only one wage can
be profit maximizing for a firm of a given type. The distribution of wage offers is
F ( w )  = l?(K-l(w)) h  Iw ere i is an increasing function on p, p (K is increasing because[ 1-
of Proposition 6). Note that K’(p) need not exist everywhere, e.g. because the density
y(p) associated with r(p) need not be continuous. If y(p) is not continuous then K’ is
to be interpreted as the left-derivative of K. For convenience, we will assume in the
sequel that the density r(p) is continuous and positive on the support of I’.
As will be shown below, the support of F is not necessarily connected. This is a
consequence of the following. If there is a concentration of workers whose b is close to
a certain value b,, then anv firm offering a wage slightly below b, may be better off
bv offering a wage larger than or equal b,. In the latter case, profits per worker will
be slightly lower, but the inflow of unemployed workers will be much higher, resulting
in a higher over-all profit. This phenomenon Iwas  pointed out by Mortensen (1990)
for the model with discretely distributed b. In case of a continuous distribution of
b, a concentration of workers at sav b, means that the density h(b) displays a peak.
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at b = b,.  Such peaks ma): be induced by the welfare system. For example, if the
non-pecuniary utility of unemployment is zero and if welfare recipients receive a fixed
amount of benefits, depending on their household composition, then the density of b
may display peaks at these amounts.
From both a theoretical and an empirical point of view, equilibrium wage (offer)
distributions with a non-connected support are unattractive. Such distributions cannot
easily be characterized in a transparent way, and this hampers comparative statics
analysis. Moreover, estimation of such distributions is complicated by the dependence
of the support on unknown parameters. Below we derive sufficient conditions on the
shape of H(b) for the support of F  t$o  be connected.
3 The special case of homogeneous firms
3.1 The equilibrium
The special case in which workers are homogeneous but productivities are continuously
distributed has been examined in detail by Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997).
It is also instructive to examine the special case in which firms are homogeneous but
workers’ opportunity costs are continuously distributed. This case has been studied in
some detail by Burdett and Mortensen  (1998). Here, we extend their analysis, and we
will pay particular attention to empirically relevant model properties.
We start by characterizing the equilibrium wage distribution for the particular
case of homogeneous firms, each having the same productivity parameter p. At the
equilibrium, each firm necessarily makes the same profit. The wage offer distribution
(and consequently 1 (w)) are continuous, and the profit function is:
new>
(P - 4 w4- (p - w)l(w)  = K;
[l+ nF(w)]2
(12)
Proposition 8 The support of F is closed.
Proof. This comes straight from the expression of r(w) which is a continuous
function of w. C l
Proposition 9 u is unique, and it follows from:
argmax(p - w)H(w)w
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Proof. We know from equation (12) that:
ed
K (P - v> H(u)-
(l+ K)”
so :
u/ E argmax(p - w)H(w)
W
Suppose that w1  < w2  both maximize (p - w)H(w),  then we shour  that a cannot be
equal to wl.  Suppose the contrary, then F(uy2)  > F(w,) = 0. Moreover,
which show‘s  tha
--
-
P - w2
K [l + KF(W,)]
2H(~w2)  = tc ’ - w1
[I + mw2q
2H(wl)
[ 1 +1K;;w2)]2w > 44
lt wi cannot be profit maximizing. cl
Note that Burdett and Mortensen (1998), when deriving zu,  omit the fact that u, is
the supremum of {arg max,(p - w)H(w)} rather than any value of the latter set.
In Subsection 2.1 we assumed that b  < p, which here amounts to b < p. From- --
equation (12) it then follows that for all w E (b,p),  X(W)  > 0. Thus, necessarily,
r(a) > 0, and b < z < p. This implies that H(w)  > 0. To put this in another way: a-
mass of workers is willing to work for the minimum wage in the market.
Since (p - w)H(w) d ecreases for w > 6,  we also have that. w < 6.  This is intuitively-
plausible, as any firm offering a wage w > 6 could increase its profits at no cost by
reducing its wage offer. In sum,
Proposition 10 There holds that b < w, w < 6 and- - - w<P
Now let us turn to the equilibrium solution for F.
Proposition 11 The equilibrium wage distribution F is unique, and it satisfies
argmax(p-  w)H(w)
W > (13)
u/ E sup u! such that (p - w)H(w)  = (P - w> H(w)
(l+ K)”
(14)
1+  KF(w)  = %  _ - (p - w)H(w)
t‘c K (P - w)fqu)’ b E SuPP(F)) (15)
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The support sf F is defined recursively.
First denote
L 71) = {X E]UI,  w[ such that lx, W[C L,, and (p - w)H(w)  is decreasing on Ix,  w[}
sCw) = hf, &)
Take
l
first w1 = w :
*if S(W) = w then Supp(F) = [u, a]
*else w2 = s(q),w3 = Sup (w < w2 such that (p - w)H(w)  = (p - w2)H(w2)).
*Go back to 2 fitl e rst step with w3  instead of  w1  until s(w2i+l)  = w.
SUPP(F)  = +J,i; W&J
Proof. By the condition of equal profit we know that for all w on the support of
F, there holds that r(w) = r(g), Fwhich gives equation (15). However, (p - w)H(w)
(which we call q(w) for convenience) may increase on [ZU,  p].
If q(w) is decreasing on [u; p] then:
q(w) =
h-4
0
2
K
which exists because of q(p) = 0, so Supp(F) = [IU, B$
Now let us assume that there is a unique interval of [w;  p], [wO;  wJ, where q is
increasing (we will prove the result in this case, the proof being the same in the general
case). There are two possibilities.
. Qo > 9(4/P  + K>2 ( see Figure 1). Then w is uniquely defined by (16). Define
It is obvious that ([-,w’ GO] U [G1; m])  c Supp(F). However:
1+ S(w,)  = (1+ K) fg> (1+4@$+.,,,,,,
Take w’ E]G,; wO], UY  E]w,; $1 such that q(w’) = q(w”) :
[g; w’] u [w”; g] seems to be a good candidate for Supp(F) as q is decreasing
on this interval and 1 + KF  decreases from 1 + K  to 1. However, for E such that
w " -&>  WI:
dw
‘I c-
r(w” - &) = K
> dw”>
[l + K&j2  > K  [l i-  KF(Wjj2
= 7+.l~“)
and a firm which offers w” would have an incentive to offer w” - E. Consequently,
such a situation can not be an equilibrium and Supp(F) = [u; Go] u [a~~;  VT].
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’ 9(w,)  < dd/P  + K12 ( see Figure 2). Then the set
{ zu > ‘1~ such that I = q(u)/(l + K)“} contains two points x’ and x” (with
x’ < 2”).
Following our previous results leads to two possibilities: either Supp(F)  = [u; x’]
or  Sqp(F)  = [-,w* GO]  u [u+  J x”] (where 6, is defined as before:
“lo = {w E]ul; w*[, q(w) = &J}).  But if Supp( F) = [u;  x’]:
7r(w1)  = K Qh  > 4h)
[l + KF(WJ2  = K  [1 + nF(x’)]2
/
> K dx >
[l + KF(X1)j2
= 7(x’)
Consequently, Supp(F)  = [tu;  ii&]  u [wl; x”]
c l
According to Proposition 11, equilibrium is unique if both sources of wage dispersion
(search on the job and dispersion of workers’ opportunity costs of employment) are
present, workers’ search technology is invariant across the labor market state (X,  = x,>,
and firms are homogeneous. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that equilibrium is
unique in the case in which workers as well as firms are homogeneous while search on
the job is possible. However, Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997) show that if
the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model is generalized to allow for dispersion of firms’
productivities, then multiple equilibria are possible.
Note that Proposition 11 provides a recursive algorithm for I? This can be used to
obtain explicit expressions for F given any H.
3.2 Empirically relevant properties
We now discuss some empirically relevant qualitative features of the equilibrium. First
of all, Proposition 11 implies that the support of F may have gaps. Specifically, either
the support is connected, or it consists of a countable set of non-connected intervals
between w and p. As explained in the previous section, gaps may occur if there are
concentrations of workers with more or less the same value of b. This is also clear from
the proof above: in order to generate gaps, (p - w) H(w) must increase for some w.
To be more specific, if H(w) is such that (p - w) H(w) is non-increasing in w for all
‘IU  f (a, p),  then the support of F is connected. Note that (i) (p - w)H(w)  is zero at b
and at p, (ii) it is positive in between these values, and (iii) w is the highest value at
which this function attains its global maximum.
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Proposition 12 If the distribution H(b) is log-concave then F has a connected sup-
jort .
Proof. There holds either that u < 6 or that w = 6.  We start with the first case.
Then w satisfies the first-order condition (p - w)h(w)  - H(w) = 0. Since H(w) > 0,
this is equivalent to
(17)
If H(b) is log-concave then h(b)/H(b) is non-increasing in b on (b,  00).  So, for all
w  E (w,  p), the left-hand side of (17) is non-increasing in w whereas the right-hand
side increases in w. This implies that (p - w) H(w) decreases on the support of F.
Now consider the case w = 6.  It is obvious from Proposition 11 that then F is like
in the fully homogeneous model, and, in particular, that F has a connected support.
cl
It is well known that sufficient for a distribution function H(b) to be log-concave
is that its density function h(b) is log-concave. Examples of families of distributions
with log-concave densities are the exponential, normal and uniform families. For other
examples, see Van den Berg (1994). Log-concavity of H (or h) rules out that the support
of H itself has gaps. Moreover, it ensures that h does not have pronounced spikes (see
Van den Berg (1994)). Note that the log-concavity condition is by no means necessary
to obtain a connected support for F.
Note that from the proof of this proposition it follows that if H(b) is log-concave
then the set {argmax,(p - w)H(w)} contains exactly one element w E (b,  p), so then
w is uniquely described by this set.
Now that we have examined the connectedness of the support of F, let us turn to
differentiability properties of F on its support, and the behavior of F and G close to
‘1~.  We should point out immediately that F(w) need not be differentiable everywhere
on the interior of its support. Specifically, if b < Zu and if lim,,, h(b) > 0 then F(w) is
not differentiable at w = 6 (see equation (15)).
Proposition 13  (a) Differentiability. If H is Cn  then F is Cn  as well, except possibly
at w = 6.  Moreover, if H is C1  then we can express the wage earnings density g(w) as
f 110 ows,
(1 - u)g(w) = /$ fwH(w)
[l+  KF(W)12
(b) Lowest wage. If w < b then
18
(<f  (w>  means  limwiuJ  f(w),  etc.) while if w -- 6 then-
f( >
l+K
‘IIl= -
WP b)
= c&)(1 + K,) > 0-
Proof. Straight from Proposition 2 and equations (15) and (13). 0
As a result, it follows that f ( t)u and g(“j)  do not display a peak at u:. If w = 6
then sure enough f(;)w and g(u) are both positive, but it is straightforward to show
that in such a case both J’  and g are increasing on their support (the equilibrium is
then equivalent to that in a,  homogeneous model). This inability to generate a peak at
u is an undesirable property of the model, since such spikes are often observed (see
Card and Krueger (1995)). Note that the model with productivity dispersion is able
to generate such peaks (see Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997)).
We now turn to a discussion of the shapes of F that can be generated from the
model with homogeneous firms. This turns out to be useful for empirical analyses. First
of all, consider the shape of F(w) on w E (6,  zo>, which is relevant only if w > 8.  It is
obvious from Proposition 11 that then the shape of F(w) on (6,  W)  is the same as in
the homogeneous model. Now consider the shape of F(w) below 6,  which is the generic
case. In that case, h(w) > 0. Rewrite equation (15) as follows,
By differentiating this with respect to w we obtain that h(w) > 0 iff
f(w) 1
1 + G(w) < 24p  - w)
Now integrate this inequality over an interval (wi,  w) in the interior of the support of
F. We obtain
Proposition 14 There holds that
F(w) > -I+ A(1 + KF(W,)). p-wK K J P - w1 (19)
But the right-hand side of the latter inequality is nothing but the expression for F(w)
in the homogeneous model in which w1 = w.  Somewhat loosely we may therefore say
that there is more probability mass at high w than in the homogeneous model, and
that the distribution of F is more skewed to the left than in the homogeneous model.
(Recall though that there may be gaps in the support given certain H.)
19
In sum, the shape of the wage offer distribution is at least as skewed to the left
a,s  in the homogeneous model. Now it may be argued that the shape of F is not of
importance  for the reason t.hat in the model with heterogeneous workers, F does not
correspond to a random va.riable  that is readily observed in longitudinal labor supply
data.5 First of all, the density of wages in the flow from unemployment to employment
is proportional to f(w) HJw). But this means that this densitv is even more skewed
t/o the left than f(w). S econdly, the density of cross-sectional wages is given by g(w).
But from equation (18) it follows that g(w) first-order stochastically dominates g(w)
in the homogeneous model, for any given F.  So, g(w) is even more skewed to the left
than it would be in the homogeneous model, for any given F.  Thus, the conclusions
regarding the shape of F  are reinforced for the distributions of wages in the inflow
into employment and cross-sectional wages. Now, it is a well-established fact that the
homogeneous model gives a bad fit to data on such wages, precisely for the reason that
F is skewed to the left and accordingly has an increasing density (see Van den Berg
and Ridder (1998) and Ridder and Van den Berg (1997)). Thus, we conclude that the
model with worker heterogeneity cannot be expected to give a satisfactory fit to the
wage data.
In contrast, in the model with heterogeneous firms, f(w) and g(w) cannot increase
as fast as in the homogeneous model. Indeed, in that model, the set of admissible wage
(offer) distributions is characterized by the property that their densities do not increase
as fast as in the homogeneous model (see Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997)
for technical details). This can be regarded as an advantage from an empirical point
of view. For example, the model with heterogeneous firms is able to provide a perfect
fit to wage (offer) distributions with decreasing densities. We therefore conclude that,
to obtain a good fit to wage data, it is necessary to allow for heterogeneity in firms’
productivities.
It should be noted that the inequality (19) on F(w)  above does not preclude that
,f (w) decreases for some w. (Technically, the inequality is on F(w) instead of f(w) .)
We will now examine brieflv to what extent it is possible to obtain a wage offer density
which is decreasing for large w if firms are homogeneous. To obtain a density that
decreases for all w sufficiently close to ZU,  it is necessary that w < 6,  since otherwise-
the shapes of f and g near w are as in the fully homogeneous model (i.e. increasing in
W ) .
Using equations (14)  and (l5),  it can be shown that, in general,
f( >w -
1
[
1-  -
2Lc  p-ii7
h( >w
H(m) 1
5Firm  data ma however provide observed random drawings from F. Bontemps, Robin and Vany
den Berg (1997) find that such data do not support distributions that are skewed to the left.
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1f2(1 - 4 [
H(w)P  -
I
P ---ii7
I( >1,  ii7 1
A first idea may be to increase K,  but this will push up wages to p,  as frictions vanish.
Formallv,.J
(p - a)H(m) = b
- UI) H(u)
(l+  K)’
then:
f( >
1 (l+~,)~H(‘izi)‘w =-
2~ [
h( >w
(p - UJ H(w)  - H(w) 1
and f (w> K--t+oo-  + Oc
From equation (15)')  if f is decreasing in w then
(p - w)2(2H(w)h’(w)  - h2(w))  > H2(w)
(where h’ is the second derivative of H), which implies that necessarily the density of
workers heterogeneity is increasing in w (because H(w) > (p - w)h(w) on the support
of F). In fact it seems that the best way to make f decreasing near the maximum wage
is to take a very small value of PC,  in order to make the ratio OH as small asK
possible (but as K  --+  0, ‘1~ --+  w). It is therefore very restrictive to obtain such case
and impossible to have f(w) = c
Figure 3 shows three cases to illustrate this discussion (the left-hand side displays
the density of the workers’ opportunity costs of employment, and the right-hand side
the equilibrium wage offer density). Figure 3.a is the usual case (we choose 6 = 0.02,
K;= ,2P = 20000).  Figure 3.b shows us that, with the right parameters, it is possible
to have a f(w) which decreases somewhere (we choose a bimodal distribution for H,
and S = 0.02, K; = 1, p = 20000). In Figure 3.c  we diminish K  (0.1 instead of 1) in
order to reduce the value of W.  Other examples for which f(w) increases for low w but
decreases for high w can be obtained with H(b) = 3b + 2(  1 - b)3/2 - 2 with support
b E (0,l)  (take e.g. p = 1.33 and K  = 0.002324; then w = 0.9561 and w = 1). However,
this does not provide an appealing shape for F  either. As a conclusion, we reaffirm
that heterogeneity in firms’ productivities is necessary for a good fit to wage data.
We end this section bv making a remark on the fit to unemployment duration
data. In the homogeneous model and in the model with only firm heterogeneity, all
unemployed individuals accept all job offers, and the unemployment duration t, has
an exponential distribution with parameter X.  However, if workers’ opportunitv costsc
of employment are dispersed then, conditional on b, t, has an exponential distribution
with parameter XF(b)  (note that this parameter is zero if b 2 W,  so in that case t, is
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degenerate at infinity). If b  is unobservable to a certain extent, then the distribution of
observed unemployment durations is obtained by integrating this exponential distribu-
tion with respect to b. This gives a rnixture of exponentials, so the observed exit rate
out of unemplovment displavs negative duration dependence. This can be regarded asc,
an advantage of the model with worker heterogeneity, since observed exit rates out of
unemployment often disp1a.y  such negative duration dependence (see e.g. the survey in
Devine and Kiefer (1991)).
4 Characterization of equilibrium
4.1 The firm’s optimal strategy
From Subsection 2.3 it follows amongst other things (i) that a higher productivity p
is associated with a higher wage offer K(p), for all p, with K(p) continuous, (ii) that
the distribution F(w) is continuous, and (iii) that w = K(p).-
Proposition 15 w E argmaxz ((I2  -  z)w) with b < w < p and w < 6.- -  _ -  -
Proof. Let r(p) denote the profit flow of a firm with productivity p,  if this firm
offers its optimal wage K(p). For w = K(p),-
4Pl
CP - w)H(w)
- = K -(l + n)2
and the maximization of the profit for a type p firm gives the result. The final line
follows directly from the previous sections. fi
As a first remark, the result that w < p is in contrast to the result in the model
with homogeneous workers (see Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997)) that both
variables can be equal. Here, as long as p > b,  any firm with the least profitable-
production technology is able to earn a positive profit per worker by offering a wage in
between
the fit of the model.
p and b. As we will see below, this can be expected to have implications for--
As a second remark, by analogy with the proof of Proposition 12, if H(b) is log-
concave then the set {argmax,(p - z)H(z)} contains exactly one element in (b,  p), so- -
then w is uniquely described by this set. We return to this below.
Now consider the steady state profit flow ~(p,  w) of a firm with productivity p
offering w: there holds that r(p, w) = (p - w)l(w),  with I(w) as specified earlier.
The optimal w = K(p) given p and F  follows from first order conditions: by taking
WP, w>law = 0 we obtain:
- [l + r;F(w)]  H(w)  + (2nf(u))H(w) + h(w) [l+ nF(w)]) (p - w) = o (20)
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under the restriction that ‘11) > u, where w- = K(p).’  Equation (20) is an implicit
culuation  for w given p and F,  for given “parameters” (or primitives) K;  and Hr.  Although
we do not use equation (20) in the upcoming derivation of the expressions, it turns out
t,o  be useful for other purposes later on.
The profit flow r(p)  of a firm with productivity p offering K(p) equals (p-K(p))l(K(p)).
Differentiation rwith  respect to p, using the Envelope Theorem, gives that r’(p)  =
l(K(p)).  Not,e  that this, together with the facts that I and K  are increasing, implies
that the profit flow I is convex in p. This suggests that high-productivity firms
have much more monopsonv power in the labor market than low-productivity firms.
We return to this issue later on.
We have
T(P)  = T(P)  + sp vw)dx*-
P,
with r(p)  following from equation (4.1). Since F(K(x))  = r(x), we can write l(K(p))
as
l(K(P))  =
As a result,
4P) =K
[
LH  0 K(p)
[l+ K,f(x)]2‘
(p_  - zLL>H(w) p
(l+ Fig2 + ps-
H 0 K(x)dx
[l + nF(x)12
Equation (21) expresses r(p)  in terms of p, I?,  ZU,  H and K.  Apart from IJ,  these are
tzue  primitives of the model. Note that limpip  r’(p)  = ~H(w)l(l  + K)~  < L~H(w)  =-
limp,,  r’(p).
From r(p)  = (p -  K(p))l(K(p))  it follows that K(p) = p - -ir(p)/l(K(p)).  Substitu-
tion of r(p)  and l(K(p))  gives w = K(p) in terms of p, I?,  u, H and K.  As a result,
Proposition 16 The wuge o#er  w = K(p) f fio a rm with productivity p satisfies the
following implicit eauation
1
K(p) = p - ,;;  y2 H(w)  + /’ H ’ Fcx’  ,dx 1 [l+ faP)12K l T [l + dyx)] H O K(P) (22)
The profit flow satisfies equation (21),  which is an increasing, convex function of p.
GTo  keep the exposition relatively brief and readable, we here omit details concerning the possible
occurrence of gaps in the support of F and the possible non-differentiability of F at b.
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Note that, for UJ  > b,  the solution for K(p) is qualitatively the same as in the model
lvith homogeneous workers (see Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997)).
It should also be noted that the support of the equilibrium F need not be connected.
A gap corresponds to a value of p for which K’(p) = 00.
Proposition 17 If H(b) is log-concave then
(a) the support of F is connected,
(b) the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. That the support of F is connected if H is log-concave follows by a simple
rewriting of the expression for K’(p) below, which follows from equation (20),
K’(P)  =
[
2&7(P)
1 + Z(p)
+ JWK’(P) (p w)
H(w) -1
Now consider (b). If H(b) is log-concave then w is unique (this follows from the
previous section). The function K(p) given w is given recursively in Proposition 16.
This gives F given the primitives of the model. Note that there is no feedback from F
to the workers’ strategies. cl
We  briefly consider the case of the introduction of a legal (or mandatory) minimum
wage ?u2  in the economy. Two cases are possible. First, suppose that w2 < p. Then:-
‘1~ E argmax(p - x)H(x)
X>Wl --
and K(p) follows as above. It should be noted that w is not necessarily the legal
minimum wage even if wI  exceeds the minimum wage that would prevail in absence
of a legal minimum wage. In other words, an increase in the legal minimum wage wl
may result in a new actual lowest wage in the market w that exceeds the value of wI.
However, it can be shown that if H(b) is log-concave then the latter cannot occur, and
the new actual lowest wage w equals wz.
In general, a sufficiently large increase in wz  shifts up wages, which makes it easier
for unemployed workers with high b to find jobs, which in turn reduces unemployment.
Now consider w2 > p. Then a fraction I’ of firms will disappear because of the- -
introduction of such a minimum wage. The new distribution of the firms’ productivities
will be the old one truncated at the minimum wage. The new minimum productivity in,
the economy will also be the minimum legal wage which becomes the minimum wage
offered at the new equilibrium.
In Subsection 4.3 we ret,urn  to the effects of an increase in wl.
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4.2 Tail properties
Proposition 18 The upper bound ‘111  of the support of F(w) and G(w) is jinite.
Proof. This is triviallv true if p < 00.  Let p = oo alnd  assume the contrary. Consider
~7~  such that K(p,)  >_ b (irhich  implies that H o  I(@,)  = 1). For any p between p,  and
;r,: equation (22) can be written as:
K(p) = p -
- P -
-
[
+ /’ Ho  Fcx)  ,dz
e [l + dyx)] 1 [l+ d?(p)
L1  + KF(p)12 i 1
(;;z2H(u)  + Jpo Ho  It(z)  ,dx
E [l + s(x)] 1 [I+ KF(P)]
- P (1 - [I+  r;ro12)  + PO  [I+  aP)12
+[l+~I‘(p)]~/Pl- 1 d x
po [l + Kr(x)]2
r
I P --I&
- I -
1 (1 + g2 H(w)  + lPOE!
H ’ K(z)
[l+ KF(sr,12
dx
I 2
2
1
I
[l+ ta$q2
The limit as p --+  oo of the second and the fourth terms equals respectively p,  and
~Ir’~P,~-P,~/[~+~~~Po~12=  Th e assumption that E,(p) < oo implies that limp+, pT(p)  =
0. Therefore, the limit as p -+  oo of the first term is 0.
Now consider the third term. The integral I in it can be rewritten as
P -
I - s r( > 2K,+ K2T(X) dxPO x 1 + 2nF(x) + KT2(X) l
It can be shown that the ratio within the integral is strictly smaller than 24 for any
x < p.  Therefore, for any p < p ,
I<- s
’ r(z)2tcdx  <- iir(x)2r;dz -
PO JT
= 2~ [E,(p) - p] < 00.
In sum, limp+, K(p) < 00  which is in contradiction with our assumption. Consequently
ii7 is finite. cl
The finiteness of w implies that firms with a high productivity have very high
monopsony power. Indeed, if p = 00  then the monopsony power index (p - w)/p  tends
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t,o  its maximum value 1 for high values of p.  Although on-the-job search and high b-
values boost worker power, t/his  is not sufficient to prevent firms with high productivities
to t,ake  a large part of the rents. The firms at the upper end of the market do not have
to fear much competition, as most other firms have lower productivity and lower wages.
This is in sharp contrast to the position of low productivity firms. Their situation is
restricted by the fact that they must pay more than the wage floor.
Proposition 19 (a) Suppose that the lowest wage offered in the market is not the
legal minimum wage. If w < 6 then
f(w)  = s(d = O
whereas if w = 6 then both ,f (w> > 0 and g(u)  > 0.
(b) rfp = +OO then
f(w) = g(m)  = 0 and ZJ > 6
(c) If p < +oo then in general both f (w> > 0 and g(w)  > 0 (although in special cases
both can be zero).
Proof. (a) This comes straight from equation (20),  using H(w)  = (p-w)h(z~) and
P - w > 0.
(b) Let p = +oo.  We know that w < 00.  By taking the limit in equation (20),  it follows
that both f (?i?)  and h(w)  tend to zero. Because of the latter, w > 6.-
(c) This also follows from equation (20). In fact,
-H(w)
-
_P ---a7
Result (b) implies that if p = 00  then there are no permanently unemployed workers.
In this case, if w > 6,  all results in Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997) on the
behavior of the right tails of f and 9 are also valid for the current model.
Result (a) above may have a strong implication for the fit of the model. Suppose
that the density of cross-sectional wage data has a nonzero  limit at the lowest wage (so
y(a) > 0). This is only compatible to b = w.  This implies that unemployed workers
always accept all job offers, so there cannot be any observed duration dependence in
the exit rate out of unemployment. (Note that in case of a legal minimum wage this
implication does not follow.)
2 6
4.3 Simulations
,4s  it is impossible to derive general compara,tive  statics results, we use simulations to
shed more light on how the structural parameters affect, the equilibrium solutions. As
our baseline model, we take S = 0.005 and h: =  20, and we take H to be a normal7
distribution with mean 2500 and standard error 1000. Note that this II is log-concave.
Finally, the productivity distribution I’  is Pareto with a minimum value equal to 3000
and a rate of decrease equal to 2.8 (so r(p) = (3000/~)~-~)).  Figure 4 plots the equilib-
rium wage offer and cross-sectional wage (or wage earnings) densities (f(w) and g(w). /
respectively), the one-to-one function K(p) between p and w, and the density h(b).
The equilibrium unemployment rate is 7.3% and the lowest wage offer a equals 2078.
4.3.1 Change in K
First, consider the effect of a change in K,  holding the others parameters constant.
Figure 5 displays the evolution of some quantities as K  changes. Figure 5a plots the
unemployment rate as a function of K,  as compared to the unemployment rate without
worker heterogeneity (which is equal to l/( 1 + K)).  Figure 5b and Figure 5c plot
tlhe  average monopsony power (defined as the average of (p - w)/p)  and the wage
function, for five cases: K  = 0.1 (in solid line), K  = 5 (dots and dashes), K  = 20
(short dashes), K  = 50 (dotted) and K  = 500 (dashed). Figure 5d plots the wage offer
density for three cases: K  = 0.1 (in solid line), K  = 5 (dots and dashes) and K  = 500
(dashed). As K  increases, firms lose monopsony power: the monopsony po-wer  decreases
whereas the wage function increases, and the wage offer density shifts to the right. The
unemployment rate decreases because workers accept offers more often (as the wage
function increases) and these offers accrue at a higher rate.
4.3.2 Imposition and change of the legal minimum wage
Now let us examine how the equilibrium solution changes when a legal minimum wage
w2 is imposed (or changes). Note that an increase of the legal minimum wage may
reduce the measure of active firms. We make K  dependent on that measure by way of
the relation K  = 2OQ). This captures the idea that the job offer arrival rate is linear in
the measure of active-firms (i.e., firms that actively search for workers). As a result, if
Wl  =  &I = p then-
a decrease of the
an increase in wl results in destruction of firms, which in turn results in
job offer arrival rate. Figu.re  6a plots the unemployment rate (in solid
line) as a function of the legal minimum wage, as compared to the unemployment rate
without worker heterogeneitv  Figure 6b plots the evolution of the mean unemployment”
7Formally 7this is incompatible with 6 < 00, but this can easily be accommodated for by truncating
the normal distribution from above at zc’.
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duration, whereas Figures 6c  and 6d  plot the wage offer density and the wage function
for five cases: the standard case (in solid line) and increases of wI  of 10% (dots and
dashes), 25% (short dashes), 50% (dotted) and 75%(dashed).
Consider increases in w1 such that w1  stays below the ex-ante minimum productivity.
Then the wage function K(p) increases and the wage offer density shifts to the right,
whereas the value of this density at, the legal minimum wage increases. As the wageti
function increases, the unemployment rate among the workers whose opportunity costb
of employment is between the old minimum wage and the new one decreases, because
thus decreases with wz.  The decrease of the mean duration of unemployment can be
explained analogously.
When wz  passes the ex-ante minimum productivity then the new minimum produc-
tivity becomes equal to wl.  Therefore K  decreases. We have two effects here: the first
one (K  constant) is the same as in the previous paragraph; it makes the unemployment
rate and the mean unemployment duration decrease; the wage function increases and
the wage offer density shifts further to the right (although the density tends to infinity
at the minimum wage because of p = ZU).  The second effect is due to the decrease of K;-
this effect is opposite to the first. The net result depends on the way K  is specified as a
function of p.  Here, except for the unemployment rate, the first effect is more important
than the second one. As for the unemployment rate, the net effect is positive, with a
value more closer to the value in the absence of worker dispersion. We then have an
increasing unemployment rate combined with a decreasing mean unemployment dura-
tion.
4.3.3 Change in the layoff rate
Now  consider what happens when S changes, holding X  constant (so K  changes too).
Figure 7a plots the unemployment rate (in solid line) as a function of 6, as compared
to the unemployment rate without worker heterogeneity. Figure 7b plots the evolution
of the mean unemployment duration, and Figure 7c  plots the wage function for five
cases: S = 0.001 (in solid line), 6 = 0.005 (dots and dashes), S = 0.009 (short dashes),
S = 0.01 (dotted) and S = 0.1 (dashed). Figure 7d plots the wage offer density for three
cases: 6 = 0.001 (in solid line), S = 0.009 (short dashes) and 6 = 0.1 (dashed). As 6
increases, K  decreases. The wage function decreases and the wage offer density shifts
to the left (the minimum wage offer remaining constant, there are more wage offers
near this minimum wage). Thus, the mean unemployment duration for a type-b worker
increases (since F(b) increases too). The unemployment rate increases because of two
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effects: first the decrease of K,  and secondly the fact that workers of type-b accept job
offers less often. The second effect is reflected in the increasing distance between the
two curves in Figure 7a.
4.3.4 Change in the distribution of the opportunity cost of employment
Finally, we simulate changes in the mean opportunity cost of employment p.  Figure
8a plots the unemployment rate (in solid line) as a function of p, as compared to the
unemployment rate without worker heterogeneity. Figure 8b plots the evolution of the
lowest wage offer in the market (in solid line), as compared to II,  itself (in dashed line).
Figure 8c  plots the wage function for five cases: p = 256 (in solid line), ,U =  1250 (dots
and dashes), ,u =  2625 (short dashes), p = 3125 (dotted) and IA, =  5000 (dashed).
Figure 8d plots the wage offer density as a function of the difference of the wage and
the lowest wage, for three cases: p = 256 (in solid line), p = 2625 (short dashes) and
I-L = 5000 (dashed). As p increases, the wage function increases, the wage offer density
shifts to the right (w increases, but less than I_L,  as we can see in Figure 8b), but it
becomes more and more concentrated around the lowest wage. There are more and more
job offers near the lowest wage, and those offers are unacceptable for more and more
workers (as the difference between II,  and w increases). As a result, the unemployment
rate and the mean unemployment duration increase.
5 Empirical Application
In this section we structurally estimate the model using a set of professional histories
drawn from the 1991-1993 wave of the longitudinal French Labor Survey. We start with
a brief discussion of these data. After that, we present the estimation method and we
a discuss the results.
5.1 D a t a
For the estimation of the model we use data from the French Labor Force Survey
collected by the INSEE. In March every year, around 60,000 French households are
interviewed. The sample is partially renewed each year (a third is dropped) so that
an individual is interviewed in three consecutive years. We use the data of those who
entered the survey in 1991. From this survey we obtain a sequence of labor market
states occupied by the individuals and the sojourn times in these states. In particular,
we have such trajectories from March 1991 to March 1994. A number of individual
characteristics is recorded at the first interview of the respondent.
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We restrict our sample to adults aged between 25 and 55. Individuals who were self-
emploved, nonparticipant or part-time worker for some period during the time span”
covered by the survey are omitted, since the behavior of such individuals, at least in
a certain period, may well deviate from the behavior as described by the model. We
stratifv the data by industry, using the first digit of the industry code, and *we  excludeC’
individuals associated to the agricultural, energy, housing, insurance and public sector
of the economy, because the number of observa,tionsin  these sectors is too small, and/or
because it can be argued tIllat firms in these sectors are not profit maximizing. (For
more details on the construction of the sample, see Bontemps, Robin and Van den
Berg (1997).) W e estimate our model separately for each of the remaining 8 industries.
For each respondent, the first spell used is the spell which is in progress at the date
of the first interview. For computational reasons, information on the durations of any
subsequent spells is not used.
The French labor force survey data have been used in a large number of studies to
estimate reduced-form unemployment duration models (see for example Magnac and
Robin (1994); Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (1998) provide a survey of this lit-
erature). These studies often find negative duration dependence of the observed exit
rate out of unemployment, even if the model controls for a large number of observed
covariates. In our sample, we do not find strong evidence of negative duration depen-
dence. Estimation of a reduced-form Weibull unemployment duration model (i.e., exit
rate at duration t proportional to W) results in an estimate of QJ  that is insignif-
icantly smaller than one. Note that significant negative duration dependence would
suggest that H(b) has a non-trivial effect on the wage distribution. However, it has
been a stylized fact of the French labor market (and, indeed, of the labor markets of
other European countries) that unemployment durations are insensitive to changes in
unemployment benefits (Bonnal,  Fougere and Serandon (1997),  Van den Berg (1990),
Devine and Kiefer  (1991)). To the extent that b  is related to unemployment benefits,
this suggests that H(b) d oes not have a non-trivial effect on the wage distribution.
The mandatory minimum wage wl is known from institutional sources; it equals
4500 French Francs per month. All monetary variables are pre-income tax. We do not
impose b to equal the observed pecuniary unemployment insurance benefits, since b
also includes search costs and the non-pecuniary utility of being unemployed. Thus,
the structural model determinants to be estimated are TV,  S,  I’  and IT.
The data contain wages below the legal minimum wage. Such observations corre-
spond to jobs that are exempt from the minimum wage constraint. These are mostly
apprenticeship positions. These are intended to help schoolleavers or unemployed work-
ers to build up the skills necessary for a more regular job (see Bonnal,  Fougere and
Serandon (1997) for more details on such positions). Our equilibrium search model does
not account for such positions. One may argue that these positions are fundamentally
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different from regular jobs, and that therefore such observations should be dropped
from the data. On the other hand, t/here  is evidence that employers use these positions
t,o  get around the minimum wage constraint. In that case, the legal minimum wage is
not, (fullv) enforced.
We feel that it would be restrictive to choose unambiguously for either one of these
two points of view. We therefore perform the empirical analysis with two different
samples. The first one (sample A) is the same as in Bontemps, Robin and Van den
Berg (1997). In this sample. all wage observations below the legal minimum wage were
regarded as missing observations. In the second sample (sample B), we include all
the wage observations from the survey. Table 1 presents, for both samples and each
industry, sample statistics on the endogenous labor market variables, notably cross-
sectional wages at the first interview. Figure 10 plots the wage densities g(w) of the
wi data in sample B.
5.2 Likelihood of the observations
It is useful to derive the likelihood of the different types of observations that we use
t,o  estimate the model. The dependent variables are elements of the individual labor
market histories,
l Individual labor market position at the time of the first interview:
x = 1 if unemployed,
= 0 if employed.
l Elapsed and residual duration in that position:
tab = elapsed unemployment duration
tof = residual unemployment duration
dOb = 1 if unemployment duration left-censored, otherwise = 0
dof = 1 if unemployment duration right-censored, otherwise = 0
hb
- elapsed employment duration
residual employment duration
dlb  = 1 if job duration left-censored, otherwise = 0
dlf = 1 if job duration right-censored, otherwise = 0
l Earned and accepted wages:
WO = wage accepted by unemployed individuals
d0 = 1 if wo  unobserved, otherwise = 0
Wl = wage of employees at time of first interview
4 = 1 if wl unobserved, otherwise = 0
3 1
l First transition if employed at first interview:
‘II = 1 if job-t,o-unemplovment,  transition,I
= 0 if job-to-job transition.
First, let us derive the likelihood of the observations from an individual who isI
unemployed at,  the first interview. The distribution of elapsed (or residual) durations t,,
in the stock of unemploved at the first interview is a mixture distribution. Conditional”
on the worker’s opportunity cost of employment b, the exit rate from unemployment
is XF(b)  and the accepted wage is drawn from the wage offer distribution truncated
at i!~  f (.)/F(b). The marginal duration distribution has a single mass point at infinity,
corresponding to the permanently (or structurally) unemployed who have b > W.-
It is not difficult to derive that if d, = 0 (which entails Ct,,  =  0) then the likelihood
is
X2-dab  exp [-X(tob  + t,f)]
+ lwo [AF(b)]2-dob  exp [-AF(b) (t,, + tar>] $$$ ~ E;)(b)
-
The first part of this expression corresponds to workers with b < Y.U;  these accept all-
job offers. The second part corresponds to workers with <b < W;  these accept some
offers and reject others.
If d, = 1 and d,,  + d,,  < 2, the likelihood equals
Of  exp [-A (4lb  + tar>]  $$,”
[ -XF(b)  (bb + bf)]  1 y$b)+ [ [XF(b)]2-dob-do’  exp
-
If dOb + d,,  = 2 then d,  = 1 and the1 likelihood equals
exP [-A (43,  + to,)] E/
+ IEexp [-XF(b) (t,,  + tar>]  1 f$ibj + [l -  H(w>]
Ul-
Here, the third term corresponds to workers with b > UI;  these reject all job offers and-
are permanently unemploved.L. ”
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Now let us derive the likelihood for an individual who is employed at the first
interview. The probability of observing an individual in the state of employment equals
1 -  u. If d, =  0 then the likelihood is
(1 - M~l?l) p + XF(lI!,)]l-dlb  exp [- (6 + XF(w,)) (t,,  + tlj)] [F (XF(w,))l-v
whereas if d, =  0 then the likelihood simply equals 1 - u.
5.3 Estimation procedure
The basic idea of the estimation method is the same as in the three stage method
developed in Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997).
1. We estimate w and w as the minimum and maximum observation on wi in the
sample (note that these are super-efficient estimators). The density g(w) and
distribution G(w) are estimated by a non parametric (kernel) procedure from
the wi data.
2. We assume a parametric form for H with a parameter vector 8. By integrating
equation (18) (which also holds in the general model; see equation (ll), we obtain
1
[l + .F(w)]
=(l-u)JyI++&
= H(t
K:
(’ - u,  = (I+ K)  J,-#dt
The second equation follows from the first by substituting w = w.  These two
equations express F and u in terms of g, K  and H. Substitution of these equations
into the likelihood function enables estimation of the structural parameters A,  6
and 8 from individual labor market histories by maximum likelihood, considering
the (estimated) g as a nuisance parameter. Note that H(b) is only identified for
b E [a~,  zj].  If H(w) = 1 then 0 is not identified. The estimation of the remaining
model parameters then reduces to the estimation of the model of Bontemps,
Robin and Van den Berg (1997) with the restriction that the job offer arrival
rates in employment and unemployment are equal.
3. From equation (20) it follows that
1 l-&j
33
K-l(w) = w +
(1 + rc’(w)) H(w)
2~f  (w)H(w) + h(w) (1 + +-u))
= w + H(w)
2(1 - 21)g(w)  (1 + KF(Vi)) + h(w)
With this we can reconstruct the distribution of productivities, using the esti-
mates of the previous steps.
We obtain consistent standard errors by bootstrapping the three step estimation e
procedure.
In order to obtain some feeling on the performance of this estimation method, we
estimate the model with simulated data. We take true parameter values that are the
same as in the baseline simulation of Subsection 4.3. Next, we draw 200 samples of
2000  observations each, and we estimate the model for each of these 2000 samples. The
table below shows a 95% confidence interval for each parameter and for the unemploy-
ment rate. Figure 9 displays 95% confidence bounds for the wage function K(p), the
productivity density y(p), and the wage density g(w) (the true functions are plotted
as solid lines).
/ True value / 95% confidence interval
0.005
20
2500
1000
73.
[0.0049,0.0051]
[17.7,21.4]
[2070,2560 1
[966,1260]
[6.6,&O]
We conclude that the estimation method works well in this case, with a sample
of moderate size. The parameters Jo and a are sometimes a bit underestimated and
overestimated, respectively. This is not surprising, given that H is only fitted by way
of information on its right tail (that is, for b  > w,  which equals 2078).-
5.4 Estimation results
We assume that H(b) is a normal distribution with unknown parameters II,  and 0.
This H is log-concave, so we impose that the equilibrium exists and is unique, and the
support of F  is connected. The structural model determinants we estimate are K,  6, I_L,  0
and I’. Table 2 reports the results.
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We first discuss the results for sample A. In this sample, w equals the legal minimum
lvage We.  For each industry, we estimate that H(zu)  = l! As a result, the model
is equivalent to a model in which workers are homogeneous. The estimates of the
remaining para,meters  equal those for the model of Bontemps, Robin and Van den
Berg (1997) with the restriction that the job offer arrival rates in employment and
unemployment are equal.
The estimates based on sample A implv that no unemployed individual would reject1
an offer of a job that pays the legal minimim wage, and that unemployment benefits do. c L.
not affect the duration of unemployment. The latter is consistent with Bonnal,  Fougere
and Sandon (1997),  who estimate reduced-form unemployment duration models using
multiple spell data. ’
However, recall that there is evidence that1  employers circumvent the legal minimum
wage constraint by offering “apprenticeship jobs”. In that case, the support of the wage
(offer) distribution extends to lower wages, and it is conceivable that workers with a
value of b  just below the legal minimum wage reject such job offers. To investigate
this, we estimate the model with sample B, within which such jobs are included (see
Table 2 for the parameter estimates, Figures lo-13  for the estimated g(w), f(w), K(p)
and  Y(P),lO and Table 3 for the estimated u and mean durations). Note that the legal
minimum wage wI  does not enter the model in this case, and that the lowest wage in the
industry equals the value reported in Table 1. With this sample, for most industries,
we estimate H(w)  < 1.
However, in general, the probability mass of H above the legal minimum wage w1
ranges from zero to just two percent. This means that H is still not very important
for the shape of the wage (offer) distribution for jobs which comply with the legal
minimum wage. Moreover, it means that the vast majority of workers accept all wage
offers at or above the legal minimum wage, when unemployed. From Table 1 we know
that the latter type of jobs concern more than 90% of all jobs. In sum, the vast majority
of workers accept almost all job offers, when unemployed. This is in line with results
from structural empirical analysis of partial job search models with European data
(see Devine and Kiefer (1991) for a survey). Clearly, this means that a shift in the
distribution of b (e.g. because of a shift in the average unemployment benefits level)
‘During the maximum likelihood iterations of the second estimation step, p and o tended to values
for which the probability that b  exceeds b  became too small to be detectable.
“We also estimated the model using Dutch labor force survey data. These resemble sample A in
t,he  sense that they contain almost no wage observations below the legal minimum wage (and any
observations below it can be attributed to measurement error), and there is no strong evidence of
negative duration dependence in the unemployment duration data. For this sample we also estimate
that H(w) = 1.
loWe  plot y(p) as a function of I’(p).  Because of the skewedness of the density, a plot as a function
of p is not informative.
do es not have a sizeable effect on equilibrium unemployment or wages.
.
One might argue that t,herefore it is not,  important to take account of dispersion
in the opportunity cost of employment. To investigate this further, we also estimate
a model that does not allow for worker heterogeneity: using sample B (see Table 2).
For most industries, this results in significantly lower estimates of A.  Note that if aCI
substantial amount of unemployed workers re,ject  wage offers below the legal minimum
wage then a model that imposes the contrary can only be reconciled with the data if
the job offer arrival rate decreases. In fact, t,he  strong decrease in the estimates of A
may indicate that the restriction that. job offer arrival rates are the same in employment
and unemployment is too strong. If the arrival rate for the employed is smaller, then a
decrease in X  may improve the fit of our model to the job duration data.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical synthesis of previous equilibrium search models, and
an empirical synthesis of previously estimated equilibrium search models. We allow
for inherent heterogeneity on both sides of the market: firms have heterogeneous pro-
duction technologies and workers have different opportunity costs of employment. We
show that such a model is consistent with stylized facts on (the lower end of) the labor
market, and we derive a number of characteristics of equilibrium. Notably, we show
that if the shape of the distribution of worker heterogeneity has a certain smoothness,
t,hen equilibrium exists and is unique, and the wage (offer) distribution has a connected
support. We also show that if there is no mandatory minimum wage then the wage
(offer) distribution does not have a spike at the lowest wage. We perform simulations
to study the effects of changes in the layoff rate, the degree of search frictions, the
mean opportunity cost of employment and other parameters, on unemployment and
wages. The model is structurally estimated with French labor force survey data.
It turns out that heterogeneity of firms, in combination with workers searching on
the job as well as off the job, can explain most of the variation in observed cross-
sectional wages. Indeed, a model with worker heterogeneity but no firm heterogeneity
gives an even worse fit (in a certain sense) to wage data than a model without any
heterogeneity at all. In the empirical analysis, the shape of the distribution of work-
ers’ opportunity costs of employment is not of importance for the distribution of wages
above the legal minimum wage. Most unemployed workers accept most job offers. More-
over, changes in the distribution of workers’ opportunity costs (which includes changes
in the unemployment benefits levels) do not have a big impact on job acceptance be-
havior or unemployment. However, many unemployed workers do reject offers of jobs
t,hat are exempt from paving the legal minimum wage, and although such jobs consti-e
36
tute a small fraction of all .jobs, ignoring them results in underestimation of the job
offer arrival rate.
One may question whether there are not other types of worker heterogeneity that areI
of more import,ance  for the distribuGon  of wages. Recent empirical studies on matched
worker-firm da.ta  suggest that the productivit,v  of a job has a strong individual-specific.I
component (see Abowd, Kramarz  and Margolis  (1998)). .The  literature on equilibrium
search models with wage set,ting  has mostly ignored this tvpe  of heterogerdy.  We  feelti
that this creates a challenge for further research.
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3 9
. Table 1: Descriptive statistics
I Food 1 Intermediary 1 Equipment
goods
Set A 1 Set B Set A 1 Set B 1 Set A
Number of observations
Unemployed
Employed
Transitions Unemp. - Emp.
Transitions Emp. - Emp.
Transitions Emp. ----)  Unemp.
Wages at 1st interview’:
lowest
PlO
Q 1
Q2
Q3
pi
mean
standard deviation
1
489 487 1179 1175 1361
69 63 74 7 1 88
4500 1283 4500 2003
4836 4583 5158 5020
5500 5400 6000 5900
6700 6500 7256 7200
8667 8500 9185 9128
10933 10833 12000 12000
7837 7600 8313 8226
3885 3908 3727 3749 I
4500 2200 4500
5405 5300 4700
6300 6250 5250
7800 7726 6500
10500 10333 9208
15000 15000 13612
9135 9041 8152
4213 4197 4302
82 130 118
1277 917 928
64 8 5 84
40 37 38
80 77 79
2000
4567
5073
6374
13000
7890
4191
T Currentconsumption
S e t
1047 1046
Set
Construction Trade 1 Transport 1 Services
telecom.
Set A Set B Set A Set B Set A Set B Set A
Number of observations 1235 1235 1729 1724 787 788 2833
Unemployed 160 1 4 8 206 187 54 52 347
Employed 1075 1087 1523 1537 733 736 2486
Transitions Unemp. + Emp. 130 1 2 3 162 157 42 42 283
Transitions Emp. - Emp. 80 82 74 76 33 33 164
Transitions Emp. + Unemp. 1 1 1 1 1 3 110 109 26 25 251
Wages at 1st interview’:
lowest 4500 1800 4500 1300 4500 2312 4497
PlO 5ooo 4800 4918 4600 5612 5500 5000
Q 1 5700 5500 5580 5313 6500 6438 5694
92 6631 6500 6808 6500 7750 7670 7042
Q3 8125 8000 9225 8992 9750 9700 9898
pbo 10761 10500 13700 13047 13000 12900 14000
mean 7538 7350 8195 7865 8743 8663 8440
standard deviation 3115 3160 3946 3949 3645 3676 4070
1: plo,Ql,Q2,Qdbo are the lOth,  25th,  50th,  75th and 90th percentile of the wage distribution.
Set
2823
310
2513
260
173
250
1280
4500
5308
6800
9417
13500
8020
4124
l Table 2: Estimation results
6
Food
Set A 0.0041
Set B 0.0043
(Ze-4)’
No Heterogeneity2 0.0041
Intermediary goods
Set A 0.0033
Set B 0.0033
(le-4)
No Heterogeneity 0.0032
Equipment
Set A 0.0032
Set B 0.0032
(le-4)
No Heterogeneity 0.0031
Current consumption
Set A 0.0044
Set B 0.0045
(1.6e-4)
No Heterogeneity 0.0044
1: Bootstrap standard error.
Ki
9.19
28.13
(6.5)
11.1
8.9
16.43
(1.2)
9.7
9.9
14.62
(1.4)
10.7
5.5
25.6
(1.2)
6.8
PI t7 6
Construction
H(g) = 1 0.0052
319 1799 0.0053
(25) (321) (2.2e-4)
*** *** 0.0052
Trade
H(g) = 1 0.0050
254 2608 0.0053
(19) (520) (1.4e-4)
*** *** 0.0052
Transport / telecom
H(g) = 1 0.0036
2 5 1 2197 0.0036
(15) (226) (1.4e-4)
*** *** 0.0036
Services
H(g) = 1 0.0064
260 2570 0.0069
(7) (13) (l.Se-4)
*** *** 0.0065
tc P I 0
6.2 H(g)  = 1
18.4 316 2297
(3.5) 08) (22)
6.7 *** ***
7.5 H(w) = 1
38.0 253 1904
(l-7) (5 .8)  (126)
9.1 *** ***
11.0
11.7
(1.1)
11.7
H(I-u) = 1
H(zu) = 1
-Y-L%
7.2
17.2
(1.0)
7.5
H(g)  = 1
295 1855
(4.2) (10)
*** ***
2: We estimate the model without worker het,erogeneity  on set B.
Table 3: Estimation implications
Food Intermediary goods Equipment Current consumption
D a t a  W i t h  W i t h o u t  D a t a  W i t h  W i t h o u t  D a t a  W i t h  W i t h o u t  D a t a  W i t h  W i t h o u t
heter. heter. heter. heter. heter. heter. heter. heter.
unemployment rate 12.9 5.7 83 60 10.7 9.3 6.0 10.1 8.5 11.3 12.7 12.8
mean unemployment duration 10.9 12.8 a; 8 20:15 26.3 31.8 17.3 24.8 29.9 19.5 29.6 33.5
mean job duration , 117.1 127.2 13;  . 3 , 139.2 173.1 169.2 , 143.0 172.8 172.8 , 109.7 128.4 128.3
Construction Trade Transport / telecom Services
D a t a  W i t h  W i t h o u t  D a t a W i t h  W i t h o u t  D a t a  W i t h  W i t h o u t  D a t a  W i t h  Without
heter. heter. heter. heter. heter. heter. heter. heter.
unemployment rate 12.0 12.5 13.0 10.8 10.6 9.9 6.6 7.9 7 9 11.0 10.2 11.8
mea.n unemployment duration 16.1 26.0 29.1 12.2 16.2 21.3 10.3 24.9 24  9 13.3 15.5 20.5
mean job duration 98.9 104.6 109.4 93.4 108.8 106.7 131.5 154.2 15;  .Y 3 77.6 80.2 85.6
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Figure 1. Proof of Propositlion 11: first case
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Figure 2. Proof of Proposition 11: second case
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Figure 3. Examples of equilibrium with homogeneous firms
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